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JUSTIFYING INDIA'S PATENT POSITION To THE UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Siidhya Ragaran, Sean Fynn & Brook BakeK
INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2013, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means Committees
using the powers under section 3 32 (g) of the Tariff Act of 19301,
requested the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to institute
an investigation 2 on issues relating to Trade, Investment, and
Industrial Policies in India, with particular reference to its effects on
the United States. In their request, the Committee requested the ITC
to conduct an investigation regarding Indian industrial policies that
discriminate against U.S. imports and investment for the sake of
supporting Indian domestic industries, and the effect that those
barriers have on the U.S. economy and U.S. jobs. Following this, the
Secretary of the US ITC instituted the investigation formally
requesting reports at a public hearing to particularly determine the
competitiveness of India's economy by examining whether India had
any significant restrictive trade and FDI policies currently maintained
Srividhya Ragavan, Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law,
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Brook Baker, Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law, Boston, MA
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' 19 U.S.C. §133 2(g)
2 ITC Investigation No. 332-543
3 International Trade Commission, Notice for Investigation No. 332-543, Aug. 29, 2013.
See also Federal Register, Vol. 79, No. 2, FR Doc. 2013-31487,Jan. 3, 2014 (notice of the
USTR)
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or recently adopted and whether exports of US firms are affected and
the measure of such effect. The investigation focused on agriculture,
manufacturing and service sectors, as well as the overall business
environment.4 The ITC's overview particularly considered changes in
tariff and nontariff measures, including measures relating to the
protection of intellectual property rights, and other actions taken by
India's government to facilitate or restrict the inflow of trade and
FDI.
The paper below largely is an extract of the testimonial filed by the
authors to the Secretary of the ITC in response to the Notice on the
Federal Register dated August 29, 2013 titled Trade, Investment, and
Industrial Polices in India: Effects on the U.S. Economy. Where required,
the paper also draws from the written submissions that the authors
made to the United States Trade Representative's (hereinafter, USTR)
office on the related question of whether India deny adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights or deny fair and
equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on intellectual
property protection. The authors submitted the testimonials to the
ITC as well as the USTR and as legal academics with expertise in
patent law, trade law, the TRIPS agreement and the law of India.
Each of the authors had engaged in this field for more than 10 years
and has closely followed the developments within India in relation to
the prescriptions of the TRIPS agreement.
4 See International Trade Commission, Notice for Investigation No. 332-543, Aug. 29,
2013
5 See Post-hearing submissions of Ragavan, Flynn and Baker, Notice of the USTR, Federal
Register, Vol. 79, No. 2, FR Doc. 2013-31487,Jan. 3, 2014
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The authors, as legal academics asserted the core point that, whatever
effect India's policies may have on the profits on multinational
companies, including those headquartered in the U.S., India's recent
enactment and implementation of its patent law is fully in accord
with the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Further, the authors
asserted that India has demonstrated its adherence to TRIPS and to
non-protectionism and a national treatment regime by revamping its
systems, instituting massive changes to further intellectual property
rights and by establishing prudent IP standards that apply equally to
both domestic and foreign companies. Each of these standards
remains in conformity with the TRIPS agreement and carefully
calibrated to accommodate its national objectives within the scope of
the flexibilities accorded under the TRIPS agreement.
The authors further reiterated that countries remain free after TRIPS
to tailor their intellectual property laws to their domestic social,
economic and cultural needs as they define them, within the bounds
of the treaty. Accordingly, as recognized within the World World
Trade Organization and the TRIPS Agreement, there is a great deal
of lawful pluralism among WTO Members about standards of
patentability and about key flexibilities, including both patentable
subject matter and grounds for compulsory licenses. India's laws and
6 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994), reprinted
in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995). See also
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 1630, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 307 (last revised July 14, 1967) (hereinafter Paris
Convention).
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implementation thus far remain well within the lawful pluralism
allowed by TRIPS.
Specifically, the authors added that TRIPS Article 31 permits
compulsory licenses for ANY reason, including the historically
sanctioned grounds of insufficient working of an invention in the
country. This flexibility was explicitly clarified in the 2001 Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. Similarly,
TRIPS leaves countries free to define patentability criteria, including
to define what is not an invention. Along the same lines, each
member of the WTO has the sovereign right to determine and
establish the threshold for the nonobviosuness/inventive-step
requirement. Thus, the authors asserted that India is within its rights
to establish that the new forms or uses of existing and known
molecules that do not significantly increase the therapeutic
effectiveness of such substances are not entitled to patent protection.
Finally, the authors pointed out that most of the questions on the
survey used by ITC remained irrelevant to the task of ascertaining
whether India's policies violate TRIPS.
With that as the background, the following paper highlights the
submissions and testimonials of the authors at the ITC. The paper
can be divided into two main parts. Part I responds to the issues that
the ITC considered with reference to India's patent legislation. In
this, the testimony traces the history of India's patents, outlines the
recent changes that were implemented under the 2005 amendment to
the legislation particularly highlighting how these changes remained
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fully TRIPS compliant. The second section' addresses India's policies
on agriculture and highlights how these policies are compliant with
the TRIPS Agreement. The conclusion highlights that
PART I: PATENTS
1. India Patent History:
India, like many developing countries around the world, reformed its
patent laws during its period of most rapid industrialization to tailor
them to its domestic social and economic needs. What is important
about this history is that the WTO TRIPS agreement restricted the
range of options available to India and other countries in effecting
such tailoring, but did not alter the goal itself. Indeed, the Preamble
and Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS clearly and forcefully posit that
countries retain the sovereign ability to adjust their intellectual
property laws and their implementation to serve local needs. The
Preamble of TRIPS recognizes an "underlying public policy objective
of national systems for the protection of intellectual property,
including developmental and technological objectives." 8 Article 7
reiterates this position that the TRIPS' objective to protect and
enforce IP rights "should contribute . . . to a balance of rights and
obligations" of members in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare. 9 Article 8 recognizes members' rights to adopt
7 Professor Brook Baker did not sign on to the section on Agriculture submitted to the
International Trade Commission.
8 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994), reprinted
in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter
TRIPS] at art. 27(1).
9 Id. art. 7.
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public interest or public health measures consistent with the TRIPS
provisions. 0 The right of WTO Members to take local realities into
account and to adapt TRIPS's minimum standards pluralistically is
further clarified in TRIPS Article 1.1.11
Historically, India embraced process-patent-only protection in
specified fields rather than product patent protection, particularly for
food and pharmaceuticals, in order to prioritize domestic issues like
access to medication and food security. India was not alone. In the
period before TRIPS, nearly 50 countries exempted pharmaceuticals
from product patent protection and an additional 10 exempted
pharmaceuticals from process patents as well. 2
The Indian Patent Act of 1970,13 (IP70) along with other mechanisms
such as drug and industrial policies were all part of the repertoire of
tools used by India to achieve its national priorities. In gist, the
process patent regime of IP70 excluded protection of the end-
product, but protected the method or the process of making the
product. The process patent regime encouraged competitive
innovation in the methods of making known products, thus, it
enabled production of products patented elsewhere using different
processes, incentivizing the development of more efficient
production processes. The system's encouragement for process
innovation was the first step to establishing India's generic drug
industry, much like how Germany established its chemical process
10 Id. art. 8.
It Id. art. 1.1
12 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW at 302 (2001).
13 See Patents Act of 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450 (1979) (hereinafter IP70).
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industries in the 1800s. Under IP70, the term of process protection
over food, drug, and medical inventions was limited to five years. 4 A
license of right authorized any person to manufacture a patented
product, without having to seek the patentee's approval.1 Inventions
relating to food, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals, were automatically
deemed to be endorsed with a license of right three years after the
patent issues. Further, the government could, in the public interest,
compulsorily license the patent if the invention was either not
reasonably priced or not worked to satisfy the reasonable
requirements of the public.
2. Changes Under the 2005 Amendment:
Many of these policies - although not their ultimate aims, were
required to be changed by TRIPS. India has been faithful to its
obligations under TRIPS, amending its Patent Act and taking many
other measures at considerable expense to comply with its obligations
while maintaining what flexibility it has under TRIPS to continue to
further legitimate domestic policies. Indeed, in many respects India
has been more forthcoming in amending its laws and policies to
comply with TRIPS than has the United States.
i. Pharmaceutical Product Patent Re me:
India's most important TRIPS-fulfilling amendment-the institution
of a pharmaceutical product patent regime-was instituted in 2005.
India had previously adopted the TRIPS compliant international
standard of patentability based on the requirements of novelty,
14 Id. 53(1)(a) (1979).
15 Id. 88.
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inventive step, and industrial applicability (utility) with respect to
other fields of technology. India was required to grant patents on
pharmaceutical product inventions as well as process inventions
because the TRIPS Agreement prevents discrimination against
particular fields of technology.
India's definition of novel4y or "new invention" includes world-wide
prior art which was was much broader than the requirement that
prevailed in the United States under 35 U.S.C. 102, under which
any use of the application material within the United States (only)
defeated novelty. Only in 2011 would the America Invents Act
introduce the concept of worldwide novelty,16 even though this
provision was heavily criticized as obstructing small-scale industries.
India's inventive stco requirement requires that the "feature of an
invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing
knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes
the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art."1  This
requirement for inventive step has been widely noted as being much
more stringent than the nonobvious requirement in the United
States, but many countries have different, indeed stricter standards
for inventive step than does the United States.1 8 In fact, the U.S.'s
16 Leahy Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, (H.R 1249) at§ 102.
17 Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, at § 2(ja) (hereinafter
PTA, 2005); See also Srividhya Ragavan and Feroz Ali Khader, Proof of Progress: The Role of
Obviousness Standard in the Indian Patent Ofice, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW
(FORTHCOMING). Ed. Ruth Okediji, Margo Bagley, Jay Erstling. Oxford University Press,
2014 (discussing how the standards of obviousness in India sets a higher bar when
compared to the United States).
18 See, e.g., Amy Nelson, Obviousness or Inventive Step as Apped to Nucleic Acid Molecules: A
Global Perspective, 6 N.C. J. L. & Tech. 1 (2004); Request for Comments on the
International Effort to Harmonize the Substantive Requirements of Patent Law, 66 Fed.
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weak standard has been a significant causative factor for the
degenerating quality of the patents in the U.S.
India has also adopted, within the framework of allowable pluralism
under TRIPS, a stronger definition of industrial applicability than the
United States. The United States' weaker standard of utility has
historically allowed the patenting of business methods and other
more abstract innovations, unlike India and many other countries
that either exclude such matters as unpatentable or consider them not
to have industrial applicability. This is one of many permissible policy
differences allowed under TRIPS. In this regard, it is also important
to note that India has codified a number of exclusions to patentability
that are similarly excluded by many other countries - abstract ideas,
theories of science, plants and animals, etc., even where the same
creations could subject to patent in the U.S. Perhaps the most
important exclusion from patentability, discussed further below, is
India's Section 3(d).
ii. Section 3(d:<
Section 3(d) does the important function of segregating patents that
result in evergreening from those that represent a true innovation.
Basically, new forms of known compounds that exhibit enhanced
efficacy will cross the threshold and be considered innovative. Other
forms that merely represent a new form of a known substance
without making any therapeutic contribution to the disease in
Reg. 15,409, 15,409-11 (Mar. 19, 2001) (listing seventeen differences between U.S.
patent law and the law of other developed countries).
19 Id. at § 3(d)
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question will fail the bar. Unlike the suspicions expressed under the
USTR's Special 301 report of 2013, section 3(d) does not represent
an unauthorized fourth requirement because the applicability of this
section is limited to one small question in one subject matter. 0
Section 3(d) has no universal application, which would be essential
had it been conceived as a fourth requirement. Similarly, the
requirement in section 3(d), as mentioned earlier, is no different from
the requirement imposed for similar compositions in the United
States. That is, in the United States, the Manual for Patent
Examination Procedure in sections 716.02 and 2144.09 at paragraph
VII discuss the use of "unexpected advantages" or "superior
properties" to determine obviousness of such structurally similar
compounds.2 1 Further, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
in several decisions has reiterated the requirement of "unexpected
results" or "surprising effect" as tests to determine patentability of
the new forms of known substances. These kinds of criteria are not
measurably different form the efficacy requirement that India uses to
assess patentability.
Granting secondary patents, which promotes evergreening, is a
controversial issue not just in India but also in the United States.2 3
The term evegreening refers to strategically patenting different forms
of a medicine's active ingredients, new uses, and/or new
20 See 2013 Special 301 Report, Office of the United States Trade Representative, available at
www.ustr.gov
21 Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, at sections 716 , 2144 available at
www.uspto.gov.
22 Id.
23 See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY. FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 2002
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formulations and staggering such protection to extend monopoly
control over various forms/uses of the medicine beyond the 20-year
term of protection. The steady lowering of standards, especially for
determining non obviousness, has in turn contributed to such
strategic patenting, which is now subject of much scrutiny in the
United States.
The struggles of the United States with a barrage of secondary
patents on medicines have served as a lesson to other countries,
including India.24 In essence, India is trying hard to prevent issues
that the United States is currently facing on account of unduly
lowering the bar to facilitate more patents. In gist, low patent
standards can dangerously interfere with follow-on innovations and
unjustly reward very low levels of innovation. For countries like
India, the effect of such lowering on innovation is quite onerous in
terms of pharmaceutical costs and untreated patients. Thus, it is
important to appreciate that invalidating patents of multinational
companies is not a sign of TRIPS noncompliance as long as such
invalidation is done using lawful patentability standards and non-
discriminatory processes as required by the TRIPS agreement. In the
United States such patents are easily issued although they can be
invalidated by litigation. But, rather than accepting the resource
investment, cost, judicial time and the loss of access to the public
inherent in the U.S. model for combating evergreening, India's
24 See Thomas Faunce and Joel Lexchin, Linkage' Pharmaceutical Eiereenin g in Canada and
Austra a, Aust -New Zealand Health Policy (Biomed Central) (2007); EVERGREENING
OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET PROTECTION, EUROPEAN GENERIC MEDICINES
ASSOCIATION.
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Section 3(d), enacted in the 2005 amendment,2 prohibits patenting of
new uses of known substances, including medicines. Similarly,
patenting new forms of known substances is not allowed unless there
is evidence of significantly enhanced efficacy. The logic of this
interesting provision is along the exact lines of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in the case of Pfz er
v. Apotex involving the Pfizer's patenting of the besylate form of
amlodipine (salt form) which Apotex claimed was obvious in the light
of Pfizer's own patent on the base compound amlodipine. 26 The
CAFC, in agreeing with Apotex that the patent on the besylate form
was invalid, highlighted the besylate form lacked the unexpected superior
results from the base compound in order for the salt form to be
patented.2 Indeed, the Manual for Patent Examination Procedure in
section 716.02 and in 2144.09 specifically memorializes unexpected
results as a test to demonstrate nonobviousness of structurally similar
compounds like isomers and homologues. 28 Thus, India's standard is
well within the lines of what has been allowed in the United States.
The Novartis judgment, which has become central to Congressional
criticism of India's IP regime, was decided significantly on the basis
of the absence of any evidence of enhanced efficiency, a valid criteria
for assessing patentability as described above. 29 In essence, the
Supreme Court of India, in a well-reasoned decision, found that beta-
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate, was revealed and claimed in a
25 PTA, supra note 9, § 3(d).
26 Pfizer v. Apotex, 488 F. 3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Pfizer v. Apotex, 480 F.3d 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
27 480 F.3d at 1368; see also In re Swain, 33 C.C.P.A. 1266, 156 F.2d 246, 247-48 (1946).
28 Manual for Patent Examination Procedure § 2144, § 716 (8th ed., rev. 2012).
29 Novartis AG v. Union Of India & Ors, Civil Appeal No. 2706-2716 of 2013.
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pre-TRIPS patent and thus was time barred from patentability in
India unless it showed significantly enhanced efficacy. 3
Unfortunately for Novartis, the Supreme Court of India found that
Novartis offered no evidence of increased efficacy of the relevant
compound whatsoever, and thus that the patent was unmeritorious
under section 3(d).3 Whatever the effect ton Novartis's bottom line
or on balance of payments with the U.S., this was an eminently
reasonable, and TRIPS-permissible, decision.
TRIPS does not require its member countries to be persuaded by the
issue patents of other countries. The argument that several other
countries agreed that Gleevec was patentable despite being a mere
variation of an existing, previously patented chemical entity is
inconsequential to India's own patent determination. If a country
chooses to adopt a higher bar for determining patentable subject
matter and/or inventive step under TRIPS, it is well within the
member's rights to do so. Indeed, Japan has a record of allowing
approximately 14% of patents that are granted in the United States.
Having a higher bar with standards is well within the rights of a
sovereign nation and well-established under the principles of the
World Trade Organization. India's Section 3(d) and the Novartis
judgment fall well within the ambit of the TRIPS agreement.
Indeed, as India transitions into a full-fledged patent regime, it is
well-worth remembering Justice Breyer's cautionary note in Laboratoy
30 Id
31 Id
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Corporation v. Metabolite: 32 "sometimes [patents] presence can
discourage research ... , by requiring complex licensing arrangements,
and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes
prohibitively so. ' ' r He advocates that patent law should carefully seek
to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it should
avoid diminished incentives resulting from under protection. '4
Section 3(d) is an important tool to serve the end of rewarding true
innovation while refusing to grant exclusive rights for trivial,
incremental changes. Further, in instituting section 3(d) and in setting
a higher patentability bar, a developing country like India would
rightly avoid the some of the excessive patenting problems that seem
to plague the United States.
iii. Opposition Procedure:
Another important feature, the opposition mechanism, embodies a
pre- as well as a post-grant opposition procedure. 35 Pre-grants
opinions conserve administrative time otherwise spent on examining
a patent application that could later be invalidated, in addition to
preserving judicial time. As for the procedure, under 25, any third
party can oppose a patent after publication of the application and
before the grant for reasons of patentability, wrongful acquisition,
inadequate disclosures, etc. On similar grounds, any interested
person may oppose the patent within one year of the grant of
32 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127, 126 S. Ct. 2921
(2006) (Breyer.,J with whom Stevens J., and Souterj., join, dissenting).
33 Id
34 Id.
35 PTA, supra note 9, at, 18, 35.
36 Id., § 25 (c), (e), (h).
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patent. 3 The grant structure circumvents one of the India's
debilitating constraints, being the backlog in the judicial system.
Hence, the grant opinions seemingly have more economic value
when compared to the USPTO's administrative opinions, for
instance, not least because there are few judicial opinions on the
question of inventiveness, but perhaps also because of the influence
of a combination of other factors such as the time taken to resolve
disputes in India.
WIPO has researched opposition procedures in depth and found
substantial variation in countries approaches to both pre- and post-
grant procedures, but clearly does not consider them unauthorized by
TRIPS. Indeed, TRIPS Article 62.4 explicitly references and thus
indirectly condones the use of opposition procedures.
iv. Intellectual Property Office Modernization:
When India amended its patent legislation, the government of India
through the Department of Commerce modernized the different
intellectual property offices at great expense. 3 Additionally, India has
worked to relieve patent disputes from the most debilitating
constraint of all: the Indian Court system. India has established the
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), as the special appellate
administrative tribunal from 2007 to hear patent appeals from the
decisions of the Controller (provided it includes a technical
37 Id, 89, § 25(k);
38 Press Release, Department of Commerce (India), Government's Initiatives in
Revamping Intellectual Property Show Results (Feb. 7, 2002).
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member).39 Akin perhaps, to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in the United States, the review of the decision of the IPAB
can be sought by the losing party by filing a writ petition on the
grounds that there is a question of law requiring the attention of the
High Court or that there is illegality or miscarriage of justice. The
Supreme Court of India has established that all decisions of tribunals
including the IPAB are subject to review before the Division Benches
of the High Court (two-judge benches) within whose jurisdiction the
concerned tribunal falls.40 The establishment of the IPAB signifies
India's commitment to implementing the patent statute.
v. Compulsory Licensing:
India has one of the most sophisticated compulsory licensing
provisions of any country -- one that fully conforms to the TRIPS
agreement as clarified by the Doha Declaration.
Section 84 of the Indian patent statue allows the government to
compulsorily license a patent three years after grant.41 Applicants
seeking compulsory licenses should provide proof that the applicant
attempted to negotiate a license with the patent owner as required
under the TRIPS agreement, and must do so for a minimum period
of six months.4 2 As for the grounds, third parties can seek a license
on the grounds that the (a) reasonable requirements of the public
39 Notifications No.12/15/2006-IPR-III (2/4/2007), Ministry of Commerce & Industry,
(India).
40 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Others, AIR 1997 SC 1125 (1997) (India); See
also Union of India v. R. Gandhi, President of Madras Bar Association, (2010) 5 SCALE
514.
41 See PTA, supra note 9, at § 84.
42 Idl., § 84(5)(4).
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with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, (b)
that the patented invention is not available to the public at a
reasonably affordable price, or (c) that the patented invention is not
worked in the territory of India.43 The term reasonable requirements of the
public is broad and can be deemed to be not satisfied if an existing
industry or trade in India is affected; the demand for a patented
article is not met by the patent holder, or the market is affected
directly or because of the patent holder's activities. These grounds are
fully in accord with traditional grounds for compulsory licenses
dating back to the earliest patent laws, and explicitly sanctioned in
Paris Convention Article 5(A).
Under Section 92, a compulsory license can be granted where the
government provides notice of the existence of a national emergency
such as a public health crisis or where it intends to use the patented
subject matter for non-commercial public use.44
Section 90(1)(vii) allows for export of non-predominate quantities
compulsorily licensed products and Section 92A requires export of
patented pharmaceuticals to "any country having insufficient or no
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the
concerned product to address public health problems, provided
compulsory licence has been granted by such country or such country
has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented
pharmaceutical products from India.".
43 Id., 84.
44 Id. 92.
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India's provisions with reference to compulsory licensing are fully
compliant under Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement. Generally,
TRIPS allows countries to determine the grounds for issuing
compulsory licensing. In any event, India has issued only one
compulsory license so far and did so in a case where there was
egregious pricing and lack of supply to the market. Although U.S.
critics have focused on the local-working rationale of the Patents
Office decision granting a compulsory license, there were in fact
three independent grounds for the license: insufficient supply,
excessive pricing, and lack of an adequately explained total failure to
work locally. Each or any of these grounds, including local working,
is legally sufficient and justified under international and national law.45
India was well-within its ights to issue the license on Bayer."
In any event, the facts of the Bayer situation demonstrates that for
the United States to expect India to not take steps because Bayer or
other companies feel that is unfair would be at the cost of its political
leadership position. In gist, at a time when India housed
approximately 20,000 patients with liver cancer and about 9,000
patients with kidney cancer between the years 2008 to 2010, a
negligible amount of Bayer's Sorafenib was imported into the
country. In fact, no importation ensued in 2008, a year when Bayer
recorded a worldwide profit of over $678 million in the rest of the
world. The patent holder's inability to fulfill its duty of catering to the
demands of the market notwithstanding, Bayer's pricing of the drug
45 Michael Halewood, Regulaing Patent Holders: Local Working and Compulsog Licenses Under
International-Law, 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 243 (1997).
46 Seegeneral4, Srividhya Ragavan, Paents Win Over Patents, THE HINDU, (March 7, 2013).
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bordered on the ridiculous. The selling price which Bayer charged at
an egregious price of Rs.2,80,428 per month (about $5,000) was
nearly five times higher than the median annual income in India.
Indeed, as a mark of its careful scrutiny, the Indian patent office
rejected an application to compulsorily license Dasatinib.
It is most important to consider the actual context of income
inequality and excessive pricing in India, which minimizes U.S. sales
and profits in India, as well as against the general trend of trade with
India, which is quite profitable for the U.S. Overall, U.S.
pharmaceutical exports have been steadily rising, as shown in the
figure below:4
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Source: World Trade Organization
47 From the post-hearing submissions of the authors to the USTR
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According to trade data from the World Trade Organization, U.S.
pharmaceutical exports rose from $39 million to $225 million during
the period 2000-2012. This is an increase of 470%.
Furthermore, U.S. pharmaceutical exports to India are growing at a
faster rate than U.S. pharmaceutical exports to the world as a whole.
Since the Patents Act was amended in 2005, export growth in India
has outpaced overall world growth in six out of eight years.
Source: World Trade Organziation
Growth of U.S. Pharmaceutical Exports
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Ham. V- Ma mo ovan-
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It is notable that there has not been a single compulsory license
granted on an American product. The one compulsory license issued
has been on a patent held by Bayer, a German firm.
Bayer's market price and "access price" for Nexavar were both
unaffordable to most of the Indian population.




-s" --- - - -
Bayer full price= _S275/yr
Bayer access price- $67371/yr
Natco Price= $1976/yr
At the ITC hearings, representatives from Bayer, the National
Association of Manufacturers, and others, noted that Bayer was
making the drug available at a lower "access price" in India.
1-1111111 ---------- ----- 111111---
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However, if one converts the full price and access price to U.S.
dollars (based on a January 2013 exchange rate) and compares them
to the average annual income-by-quintile, the data shows that both
prices exceed annual income of even the top 20%.
Sources: Income and income distribution data from World Bank;
Prices from the Nexaver compulsory license
This reality has to be weighed against the fact that in India, insurance
coverage exists broadly for not more than about 5 to 20% of the
population.48 Most Government sponsored schemes have a cap of
Rs. 30,000 (approx.. $ 500) and is limited to hospitalization. Further,
domiciliary treatment (medication) is not covered as part of most
insurance in India. 49 Within this, the market shows enormous
variations. Much of the insurance is privately acquired as opposed to
Government sponsored or as part of employee benefits. It is
estimated that the annual pay-out for those who have insurance is in
the range of $1500-2000.0
vi. Bolar Provision:
Sections 107A, a bolar-type or "early working" provision, introduced
via the 2005 amendment, allows for storage of patented material
during the patent term to facilitate marketing immediately after the
expiration of the patent term. 1 Use of the patent for research, data
48 E-mail from Professor Surupa Gupta, University of Mary Washington, (Feb 12, 2014)
(on file with the author, Ragavan).
49 E-mail from Mr. D. G. Shah, Vision-India Limited, (Feb 23, 2014) (on file with the
author, Ragavan).
50 E-mail from Professor Surupa Gupta, University of Mary Washington, (Feb 12, 2014)
(on file with the author, Ragavan).
51 Patents Act, supra note 9, at § 107(A)
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gathering, and seeking regulatory-approval, both domestically and
abroad, are exempted from being construed as infringement. The
New Delhi High Court approved the operation and the
constitutionality of the provision in Bayer v. Cipla.52 Such regulatory
exceptions fall within the ambit of Article 30 which allows every
country to consider the legitimate interests of third parties in
structuring such exceptions. Indeed, bolar exceptions have been
considered in a WTO dispute opinion of a panel "Canada - Patent
Protection for Pharmaceutical Products" - (adopted on 7 April 2000)
upholding Canada's bolar and regulatory exceptions, similar to that of
India's. Even though the U.S. has attempted to block the use of Bolar
type provisions to allow a patent exception for purposes of exporting
patent protected subject matter for purposes of obtaining regulatory
approval in some of its bilateral and regional trade agreements, it is
completely lawful for countries like India to allow such foreign
registration as a limited exception under Article 30.
vii. Exhaustion of Patent Rights:
Section 107A(b) embraces an international exhaustion of the rights of
a patent owner.5 3 Thus, the sale or importation into India of a legally
procured patented item from anywhere in the world will not amount
to infringement. 4 That is, there is no need for authorization by the
patentee or his assignee as long as the product was sold with due
permission of the patent owner (or assignee). In fact, even
importation of a product acquired from sources other than the patent
52 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, (2009)41 PTC 634(Del).
53 PTA, supra note 9, § 107A(b)
54 Id. § 107A(b).
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owner (or assignee), for instance, from countries not yet recognizing
product patent protection, would be covered by the section. Article 6
of the TRIPS Agreement explicitly allows members to choose a
regime of exhaustion and ensures that they be challenged under the
WTO dispute settlement system. The Doha Declaration, under
paragraph 5, has reaffirmed that Members do have this right, stating
that each Member is free to establish its own regime for such
exhaustion without challenge. 5
viii: Criticisms about revocation of patents in India
Several statements and submissions to the ITC and the USTR,
including that of BIO, criticized India for patent revocations through
post-grant reviews by courts or the Patent Office.5
6
First, establishing judicial standards (or statutory interpretation) goes
to the core of an independent judiciary. The General Obligations
outlined from Article(s) 41 to 61 of the TRIPS agreement supposes
the establishment of an independent judiciary with rights and
authorities that are consistent with that sovereign government. Under
traditional principles of international law, no country, much less
industrial groups, can dictate the constituents of "judicial standards"
of another country. The United States has not and will not tolerate
55 Annex IC to the General Agreement on Tariff s and Trade, Uruguay Round, World
Trade Organization, done at Marrakesh, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1981 (1994).
56 See Bio's submission to the ITC, page 4 (complaining of "counterfeiting, large backlogs
and patent office inefficiency, differing administrative, legal, and judicial standards for
patentability, compulsory licensing, inadequate data protection, and a need for
harmonization of substantive standards and processes across patent offices around the
world. Issues unique to biotechnology include patentability of biotechnology inventions,
double patent review systems, genetic resource access and benefit regimes, and
technology transfer issues that involve intellectual property.")
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foreign interference into the functioning of its judiciary, and no other
country should likewise accept such criticism.
Page 8 of the BIO submission complains specifically about several
patent revocations:
The Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) revoked
several pharmaceutical patents in post-grant opposition proceedings
in the last two years including patents protecting Sutent, Pegasys,
Ganfort, Combigan, and Renadyl.
Notably, a close comparison of the reasoning used by the Indian
patents office shows remarkable parallels to the reasoning used by
U.S. courts to invalidate patents here in the United States. As an
example, in the following paragraphs, I examine Ganfort &
Combigan's (which was one application for a combination drug)
treatment in the United States.
In India, Ganfort and Combigan were covered by Patent No.212695
titled "Hypotensive Lipid (prostaglandin derivatives) and Timolol
composition and methods of using same" The patent related to a
fixed combination of Bimatoprost and Timolol." The patent was
challenged as being obvious on the grounds that the only big
difference between the invention and the prior art was that the
invention was a single dose composition as opposed to separate
administration of the combination. 8 The patent was invalidated in
India for not traversing the nonobviousness requirement.
57 Application for Patent bearing No. 219504
58 Anubha Sinha, IPAB revokes Allergan's patent on eye drugs Ganfort and Combigan,
SpicylP, (2013)
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The interesting aspect which BIO does not highlight is that fact that
in Allegan Inc vs. Sandoz),9 a full panel Court of Appeals for the Court
of Appeals for Federal Circuit in dealing with Combigen's claim one
INVALIDATED the claim on the grounds that "unexpected results
and prior art teaching away were NOT sufficient to outweigh the
other evidence of obviousness."6
Both timolol (a beta blocker) and brimodine (an
alpha2-agonist) were commercially available in their
claimed concentrations at the time of the invention and
were used to treat opthalmic conditions. The primary
prior art reference, DeSantis, expressly taught serially
administering both a beta blocker, such as timolol, with
a brimodine in a fixed combination. It also provided
"an express motivation to combine alpha2-agonists and
beta blockers in order to increase patient compliance."
Slip Op. at 8.
The equivalent in India of the unexpected results test used in the
United States is the enhanced efficag. A Federal Circuit panel validated
the method claim - with Judge Dyk filing a dissent asserting the
invalidity of the claim.
Indeed, the IPAB opinion states that:
"We too are of the opinion like the Federal Court that
there was a reasonable expectation of success in view
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of the DeSantis. Therefore for the above reason, we
find that the invention is obvious. ' 61
In India, a limited number of claims were filed and hence, only these
were contested. In the U.S., even though Sandoz succeeded in
establishing that claims of '463 patent were invalid as obvious, the
number of filed claims were more and the Federal circuit ruled that
some of those claims (4 of 149) were not obvious, and that delayed
the entry of the generic.
Similarly, with respect to the drug Pegasys, the application to patent
was filed by Roche in 1997 for "pegylated interferon alfa2a." The
application matured into a patent in 2006 bearing no. 198952. A post-
grant opposition was filed by a local companies on the grounds that
interferon is a known protein, which when conjugated with the
polymer PEG through the process of PEGylatio (a process of
covalent attachment of polyethylene glycol polymer chains to another
molecule or therapeutic protein) achieves improved stability,
solubility, and reduced immunogenicity. Interestingly, Roche was able
to traverse this opposition at the patent office level. On appeal, the
IPAB's explained its reasoning for invalidating the patent as obvious
as follows:
"Interferon had already been used to treat hepatitis C.
There were problems in the use of this protein as such.
PEGylation was known from 1970s. Pegylation of
proteins was known to improve the activity of the
61 Ajanta Pharma v. Allergan USA, avai/ab/e athttp://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/173-2013.htm
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proteins. There was intense activity in the field of PEG
chemistry and the person skilled in the art will be
acquainted with it, if not directly involved in it. Linear
conjugates of protein showed improvement over
unconjugated protein. ... the person of skill In the art
takes a look at Monfardini and also at the other
exhibits. He knows that the activity of interferon has to
be improved for Hepatitis C cases. He knows that
linear pegylation will improve it a bit. He knows that
branched pegylation has shown marked improvement
over linear conjugates in the case of superoxide
dismutase and three enzymes. He is confident that
branched PEGylation of Interferon will work; it has
worked in Monfardini with enzymes. Monfardini gives
him the structure on a platter. He also knows that he
can work with molecular weight range of 5000-40,000
daltons to strike oil. He has reason to believe that
higher may be better."
It is understandable that Roche does not like the judgment - but the
above paragraph(s) show case due process and a reasoned judgment
in action.
Notwithstanding the above, India recorded at that time a total of 10
to 12 million patients suffering from Hepatitis C - for which Pegasys
offered a treatment. A six-month treatment of pegasys cost
approximately Rs. 4,36,000 lakhs (approx. $ 8400!) and was
discounted at a price of approximately Rs. 3,14,000 lakhs ($ 6000).
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The drug is taken in combination with Ribavarin, which cost
approximately another Rs. 47,000 thousand ($1000). Given the cost,
roughly, a total of 1400 patients were treated. 62 Yet, it was patented in
India until it was invalidated and was NOT ever subject to
compulsory licensing.
Similarly, another drug cited by BIO -Sunitinib, (Sutent) -whose 50
mg tablets were marketed by Pfizer for an exorbitant price of Rs.
61,000 for a strip of seven tablets ($ 1200 approximately) was also
not subject to compulsory licenses. What BIO does not add here is
the fact that its members cannot sell these drugs even to its American
patients at this price, save for "the 1%" in this country.
63
Similarly, many of the other issues-that BIO as well as other industry
groups like PhRMA decry equally-lackadequate basis. For instance,
in Mayo v. Prometheus64 a unanimous Supreme Court struck down a
method of medical treatment claim as being directed to a law of
nature and thus patent ineligible! Thus, exclusions from patentability
are not alien to the U.S. legal system. Other countries exclude such
claims from protection. For example, in Canada methods of medical
treatment are not patentable under section section 12.04.02 of its
Manual of Patent Office Procedure. Further, TRIPS Article 27.3
further allows for such exclusions.
As for revocation of patents, BIO's and this industry group's
statement leaves the impression that revocation of patents is a rare
62 Id.
63 Prashanth Reddy, Estimating the number of Hepatitis patients treated by Roche's
Pegasus (2012)
64 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012)
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and unusual phenomenon! The following data examines two hundred
and eighty (283) three cases where Federal District Courts have
examined the patent validity between 2007 and 2011. Of the 283
cases identified, only in 39 cases were the claims determined to be
valid. The following table provides a detailed summary:
Pen ae nDistrict Courts involving validity by Year
207 08 09 2010 2011 Tot
C~s~ her caim i pten hld nvlid46 49 54 49 45 4
Coaseo wer oim. n patent hold vod 12 SL 1
L° L
"ecn - Ier clim n aethl aid2T1% 1~ 6% 4
About 243 of the 283 cases had claims that were invalidated by the
District Court. That is, in a whopping 86% of the total cases
examined, claims were invalidated.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is also not shy of
invalidation of claims where the court believes is warranted. The
following graph provides the number of patents invalidated by the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from 2002 to 2012.
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Chart2: Pmentof Ptent
Source: White Paper Report; United States Patent Invalidity Study,
2012.
Revoking patents merely point to a robust judiciary reviewing
imperfect decisions by harried patent examiners. Several of the
submission decries patent revocations in India as if
denials /revocations /invalidations never occur anywhere else. The
sophistication of a patent system is not in the numbers of patents
issued. It is in the quality of patents. Decreasing the bar for patenting
in the United States is cited as a reason for the Supreme Court's
unprecedented activity in this area of law. Academics have decried
the pathetic quality of patents in this country. Forums like the
International Trade Commission has a burden to ensure that it does
not set the United States on a course to punish others countries for
instituting quality based standards.
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PART II: AGRICULTURE
India, like other developing nation counterparts, took advantage of
the flexibilities in Article 2 7 (3) of the TRIPS agreement which
mandates establishing a protection regime "either by patents or by
enacting an effective sui geneis system." In light of Articles 7 and 8 of
TRIPS, the effectiveness of a plant protection regime established under
Article 27 must be judged by its ability to accommodate local/
national welfare and economic goals. Such a reading of the effectiveness
requirement fits more comfortably with the other sub-sections of
Article 27 which provides that members may choose to protect
biological or microbiological materials. Member's flexibility to
establish an effective system increases when using a national yardstick.
Considering this, India enacted the Protection of Plant Varieties and
Farmers Rights Act of 2004 (PPVFA)65 under which three separate
vaneties can be registered, being: (1) New Variety; (2) Extant Variety,
which refers to an existing variety discovered for the first time; and
(c) Farmer's Variety, based on community property concepts. 66
i. New variety: A variety would be eligible for protection as new
provided it is novel, distinct, uniform, and stable-a threshold similar
to the UPOV requirements. 67 Examination guidelines set out the
principles used for testing the distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability
(DUS Guidelines) of a variety to determine its registration status.68




68 See General Guidelines for the Examination of Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability and
the Development of Harmonized Descriptions, Protection of Plants Varieties &
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Information such as (1) the geographical origin of the material; and
(2) any contribution by farmer, community, or organization to the
development of the variety, (3) information about the use of genetic
material conserved by any tribal or rural families in the breeding are
required to be given in the application. 9
ii. Extant Variety: In order to ensure that an appropriate bar is
instituted in a country that is rich in biodiversity and traditional
farming practices, the extant variety register was created to as a
compilation of matters known and existing in the public domain.
This classification indirectly creates a higher bar to determine
distinctiveness of a new variety. Indeed, the extant variety
classification takes care of India's obligation under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) to which it is a signatory. 0 The
Convention requires member states to take adequate steps to
preserve biological and genetic materials. Section 28 of the PPVFA
provides that the government, as the owner of the extant varieties,
enjoys the right to determine their production, sale, marketability,
distribution, importation, or exportation. Government ownership
over the materials ties in with the objective of protecting biodiversity
and allowing the government to negotiate with bioprospectors. An
Extant Variety Recommendation Committee (EVRC) develops
appropriate procedures for examining applications to register an
Farmers' Rights Authority, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, Government of
India, NASC Complex, IARI, New Delhi-110012 [hereinafter "DUS Guidelines"]
69 Id. § 18(1)(e), 40.
70 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
"CBD"].
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extant variety." By the end of 2010, from a pool of 297 applications,
123 extant varieties were registered.
iii. Farmer's Variety: Within this vanety typology fall plants which are
traditionally cultivated and evolved by the farmers in their fields, or is
a wild relative or land race of a variety about which the farmers
possess the common knowledge.2 The reason for protecting farmers'
rights is the underlying assumption that genetic diversity is enhanced
when varieties are adapted using traditional farming techniques.7' By
2010, after considering 44 applications three varieties of rice-
Indrasan, Hansraj, and Tilak Chandan-became the first of the
farmer's varieties registered in India, and perhaps, also in the world.
Other features of the PPVFA are all part of the suigener/s system that
allows a country to tailor a regime that protects plant varieties while
making adequate allowances for local issues. The creation of the
Gene Fund, for instance, is another feature created by the central
government for the benefit of the farmers.7' The fund helps reward
farmers whose existing variety/material is used as a source to create a
new variety.75 Similarly, the PPVFA allows farmers to retain their
traditional right to save and reuse seeds from their harvests with
some restrictions and conditions. The PPVFA has also introduced a
right to community compensation in recognition of traditional
knowledge contributions. Section 43 reflects a community property
71 See Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Regulations, 2006, Gazette of
India, Notification (Dec. 7, 2006).
72 PPVFA, supra note 38, § 2(Q.
73 Id.
74 See PPVFA, supra note 38, §s 39, 45.
75 Id. § 39.
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philosophy by providing that "[b]reeders wanting to use farmers'
varieties for creating essentially derived varieties (EDVs) cannot do
so without the express permission of the farmers." 6 Thus,
communities can stake a claim of contribution from breeders if a new
variety is derived from information or a contribution is made by the
local community. 7 If the community's claim for compensation is
established, the breeder must deposit the compensation in the Gene
Fund.78 Lastly, the PPVFA provides for "benefit sharing" -which
refers to sharing a proportion of the benefits accruing to a breeder of
a new variety with qualifying claimants, if any, who could be
indigenous groups, individuals, or communities. That concept, first
envisaged in the CBD, has been more clearly expounded on the
PPVFA and structured to work closely with the community rights
principle detailed earlier. Thus, the statute mandates that before
registering any new variety, the statutory authority should invite
claims for benefit sharing.8
CONCLUSION 81
Along with the above testimonial, the authors also filed detailed post-
hearing reports both to the ITC and the USTR addressing questions
and concerns that were raised by the Commissioners during the
76 See PPVFA, supra note 38, § 48.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. § 2(b), 26.
80 Id. § 26.
81 See International Trade Commission, Report on Investigation No. 332-543, available at
http://www.usitc.gov/press room/news release/2014/er122211254.htm (for details of
the ITC's Report on the Investigation); See also USTR Special 301 Report, aiailable at
www.ustr.gov (for details of the USTR's Report on its Investigation of India's trade
practices).
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hearing. The authors highlighted that taking any step that affects
India detrimentally will be a strategic mistake for all of the following
reasons:
1. India has not done anything during the examination period of
this report to warrant changes;
2. Much of industry's requests are unsupported by specific facts
and figures;
3. All of India's actions are well-with its negotiated rights under
the TRIPS agreement; within established due-processes and
procedures;
4. India is one of the few countries in that region where the
United States enjoys good public opinion;
5. Other industries, Boeing, being a great example, has no
grouse with India and its intellectual property laws.
The authors cautioned both forums forum from setting a course that
could result in labelling other countries for exercising their sovereign
powers.
